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Purpose - The approach taken by international laws and standards to impede terrorism treats terrorist 
financing as another form (predicate crime) of money laundering. This approach justifies the 
integration of terrorist financing into money laundering counter-measures with an exaggerated focus 
on two inaccurate assumptions: terrorists’ involvement in criminal activities (especially organized 
crime), and utilising money laundering tools by terrorists to move their funds. Regarding the nature 
and characteristics of terrorist financing, this paper aims to examine whether from a factual 
standpoint, it is sufficiently reasonable to address the suppression of terrorist financing by analogy 
with money laundering.  
Design/ Methodology/ Approach – The process of terrorist financing will be examined in regard 
to the funding requirements of terrorists and the methods and tools that terrorists use to raise, move 
and store their funds. The process of money laundering will be compared with terrorist financing. The 
role of money laundering in terrorist financing will be discussed. In the core part of this paper, the 
assumptions justifying the inclusion of anti-money laundering measures to terrorist financing will be 
challenged.  
Findings – What terrorist financing and money laundering share in common is money. However, 
there are fundamental differences between them with regard to the sources of funds and the direction 
of financial flows. None of the elements _‘accumulation’ and ‘legitimization’_ involved in money 
laundering are necessarily engaged in the process of terrorist financing. This questions the 
authenticity of the assumptions which underlie the adopted approach. It also requires further 
investigation on the effectiveness of the integrated counter-terrorist regime, which will not be covered 
by this paper.   
Originality/ value – This paper provides a comprehensive introduction for those dealing with the 
greater question of whether the terrorist financing can and should be tackled by anti-money 
laundering measures.  
Keyword Terrorist financing, money laundering, terrorism 






Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon (Chaliand and Blin, 2007), recently, there 
appears to be widespread concern over the “intensity and urgency” of attacks on civilians or 
civilian property carried out with the purpose of threatening ordinary people or governments 
or international organizations into acting in a particular way or desisting from action (Calmy-
Rey, 2009, p. vii). As a result, the necessity of having adequate counter-measures and 
international cooperation are regularly reminded.   
Current concerns over terrorist threats have directed international attention to financial 
support for terrorism since financial and material resources have been identified as the 
lifeblood of terrorist operations (Bush, 2001). It has been argued that drying out the financial 
flow from terrorist financers to terrorist groups or from terrorist headquarters to terrorist cells 
can largely hamper terrorist capacities to attack (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011, p.2).    
However, from the beginning, there has been an argument about how the financing of 
terrorism needs to be treated (the FATF, 2000-2001, p.28). On the one hand, it is argued that 
due to the link and nexus between terrorism and organized crime, terrorist financing can be 
adequately targeted under already existing measures established to prevent the financial 
aspect of criminal (organized) activities. In other words, it is assumed that as terrorist groups 
are involved in criminal activities to finance their operations, the same laundering methods 
are used by both terrorism and organized crime to launder their funds. According to this 
assumption, even if terrorist funds are derived from legal sources, terrorists “process these 
funds- that is, move them from the source to where they will be used- in much the same way 
that non-terrorist criminal groups launder funds” (the FATF 2002-2003, p.3). This 
assumption underlies the approach taken by international laws and standards to impede 
financial flows towards or from terrorist groups. The most prominent example is the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (the FATF) Recommendations which 
requires states to criminalize terrorist financing as a predicate crime to money laundering (the 
FATF, 2012, Recommendation 5).  
On the other hand, some are of the opinion that terrorist financing constitutes a distinct 
category of crime; accordingly, they question the capability of anti-money laundering 
measures in the fight against terrorism (the FATF, 2000-2001, p. 20).  It is argued that there 
are fundamental differences between money laundering and terrorist financing with regard to 
the sources of funds and the “direction of financial flows” (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011, p. 
2). In relation to the former, while the money involved in organized crime is derived from 
criminal activities, terrorism can be financed by both legal and illegal sources. With respect 
to the latter, while the purpose in money laundering is to conceal the criminal origin of 
money so that it appears legitimate, the aim in terrorist financing is distributing the funds 
whose sources and transfer are often legitimate.   
By considering the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing, this chapter will examine 
whether it is sufficiently justifiable to address the suppression of terrorist financing based on 
analogy with money laundering and its predicate crimes.[1] To do so, in the Part 2, the 
process of terrorist financing will be examined in regard to the funding requirements of 
terrorists and the methods and tools that terrorists use to raise, move and store their funds. 
Part 3 will address terrorism typologies on the basis of the strategies that terrorists apply to 
finance their activities. In part 4, the process of money laundering will be compared with 
terrorist financing and the role and importance of money laundering in terrorist financing will 
be discussed. In the core part of this chapter, those assumptions justifying the inclusion of 
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anti-money laundering measures to terrorist financing will be challenged, to conclude that 
while terrorist funds can be processed by the same tools used by launderers, none of those 
elements involved in money laundering by organize crime are necessarily engaged in the 
process of terrorist financing.  
2. Nature and characteristics of terrorist financing 
2.1 Various needs for financing terrorism 
The first step in identifying the flow of funds to terrorists is to understand the funding 
requirements of terrorists. Terrorists’ requirements can be explained with regard to their 
activities or the nature of their needs.  
In terms of terrorist activities, terrorists’ financial needs can be divided into two categories. 
Terrorists need “operational resources” associated with conducting specific terrorist attacks; 
these include the costs of attacks, the salaries of individual operatives, communications, 
training, travel and logistics. Terrorists, in the case of a large group, also require recourses for 
their “broad organizational requirements” to create, maintain and develop a terrorism 
infrastructure (the FATF, 2008, p.7).  Evidence shows that while the current operational costs 
of terrorist attacks are often very low relative to the damage they cause (ibid), organizational 
costs are beyond the direct costs.    
Regarding the nature of funding requirements, terrorists’ resources are classified into three 
categories: money and financial instruments, tangible and intangible resources (Vittori, 2011, 
p.13). “Money” and other negotiable and financial instruments are the most important 
resources required by terrorists. Terrorists needs money “to buy weapons, bribe local 
officials, pay operatives, write propaganda, provide a social network that builds a popular 
base and otherwise fill a myriad of purposes” (Byman, 2001, p.87). It is also a convenient 
means of storing wealth.    
Tangible resources are also needed by terrorists.  At the very least, terrorists need four types 
of tangible goods to carry out their operations (Vittori, 2011, p.15). “Life’s necessities” 
including food, accommodation, clothing, travel cost and so on are the basic needs of 
members of terrorist organizations. Terrorist groups also need members and “personnel” to 
carry out their activities. In addition, terrorists need to have an effective communication 
system such as access to media, internet, cell phones and so on to communicate with each 
other, disseminate their information, justify and advertise their ideology and send their 
messages to their victims (Hoffman and Inc, 2006). Tangible goods also include “operational 
resources” which are required to commit violence (Vittori, 2011, p.18). They range from 
simple knives to very high-tech weapons, depending on the complexity of terrorist operations 
and groups.     
Terrorists also require “intangible instruments”. “Operational space” or sanctuary is the time 
and space needed to plan, train for, and execute terrorist attacks (Cargin, Daly and 
Corporation, 2004, p.45). A sanctuary can be a small house at the centre of a big city or a big 
camp or farm far from any prying eyes. “Operational security” resources are also needed to 
enable terrorists to keep security forces from discovering their location, plans and the people 
involved in terrorist activities (ibid, p.47). Furthermore, terrorists need “intelligence” to plan 
how, where and when they execute their terrorist activities. How much information is needed 
depends on the scope and complexity of operations (ibid, p.50). Terrorist groups also need 
“publicity” to promote their ideology, justify their violent actions and encourage people to 
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join them (Vittori, 2011, 20-1). Without effective “leadership”, all of the resources might be 
useless; so, “command and control” mechanisms help terrorists to plan, coordinate and 
execute their attacks (Cargin et al., 2004, p. 40).  
2.2 The sources of terrorist financing 
Terrorists meet their funding needs in different ways, depending on the type and purposes of 
groups, the inherent capabilities of groups, the “opportunities at hand” and the types of 
resources needed (Passas, 2007, p.32). Also, terrorists can be self-financing or sponsored by 
states or private actors, individuals, companies and organizations (Bantekas and Nush, 2007, 
p.220).[2] In either situation, funds can be derived from legal or illegal sources, or both.   
2.2.1 Illegal sources 
It is believed that because of the dramatic decrease of state-sponsored terrorism, terrorists 
have turned to alternative sources of funding, including criminal activities such as arms 
trafficking, extortion, credit card fraud, smuggling, robbery, cheque fraud, racketeering, 
kidnap-for-ransom and more importantly drug trafficking (the FATF, 2008, p. 15).  
Drug trafficking is the most important and attractive source of funds for large terrorist groups 
(Ibid). This phenomenon, called “narcoterrorism”, involves terrorists groups cultivating, 
refining and distributing narcotic across the world (Vittori, 2011, p.36). This trend has been 
apparent since the 1990s. It usually takes place in countries where such groups control 
territories (Bantekas, 2003, p.317). Evidence shows that, for example, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia, the Peruvian Shining Path, Taliban, Al-Qaida and Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan use drug trafficking as a source of terrorist funding (Berry, 2002, 
p.165).  A 2007 United Nations report declared that the total value of the export of drugs 
from Afghanistan stood at around 4 billion USD divided up among insurgents, warlords and 
drug traffickers (Vittori, 2011, p.36).  
2.2.2 Legal sources 
Terrorism may be financed with considerable support and funding from and through legal 
sources, including donations and investment in legitimate businesses.  
2.2.2.1 Donations and the role of non-profit organizations   
Donations, which may come from individual donors or from charities, are a common means 
of financing terrorism (ibid, p. 38). An individual donor can be a wealthy person who directly 
donates huge sums of money to a terrorist group.[3] Donations can be also solicited from 
those who donate as part of their religious obligations [4] or from diasporas who seek self-
determination.[5]       
Donations are usually collected through non-profit organizations such as charities. Enjoying 
public trust, having a global presence that provides an opportunity to operate internationally 
and being subject to lighter regulatory requirements than other financial institution are the 
characteristics of these organizations which make them attractive to terrorists (the FATF, 
2008, p.11).  
Charities can be abused in different ways. Terrorists may take over an entire charity and use 
it as a front organisation. In such a case, called “sham charity”, terrorists use the charity as a 
vehicle to perpetrate fraud against donors in order to raise and disguise funds for terrorism 
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(ibid, p.12). Terrorists may also infiltrate an established charity by taking over some branches 
of a large charity and diverting some portion of the donations collected for humanitarian 
purposes to terrorists. For instance, in 2003, the Chief Executive Officer of the Benevolence 
International Foundation, an Illinois-based charity in the US, was found guilty of transferring 
US$ 315,000 of charitable donations to terrorist groups (ibid).   
Non-governmental organizations can also provide facilities for terrorists, such as a “shipping 
address, housing, employment, identity cards, a recognized reason to be at a particular 
location” (Vittori, 2011, p.40). For example, Al-Qaeda members confessed that they received 
identification cards from the Kenya-based Mercy International Relief Organisation as they 
plotted the 1998 embassy bombings (Stern, 2003, p.273).   
In addition, the role of non-profit organizations, companies and “sympathetic financial 
institutions” in transferring funds or logistical resources to terrorists is considerably 
important.  For example, they can use their bank accounts to collect funds or transfer them to 
any destination where they are required (the FATF, 2003-2004, p. 9).            
 
  2.2.2.2 Investment in legitimate business  
Legal businesses are considered as a complex and “versatile tool” for the financing of 
terrorism (Koh, 2006, p. 22). In its simplest form, terrorists can establish a local business and 
use its income for their purposes. They can also invest in stocks, banks, real estate, 
construction firms, tanneries, bookstores, honey shops, trade businesses, restaurants and so 
on. Evidence shows that large terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have invested in various 
businesses such as wood and paper industries in Norway, hospital equipment in Sweden, real 
estates in London, and newspaper ink and honey in Middle East (Jacquard, 2002, p. 128). 
Like non-profit organisations, such businesses and front companies can provide other 
facilities such as access to bank accounts and postal addresses. Furthermore, they provide 
cover for the purchase and acquisition of explosives and chemicals needed for terrorist 
attacks (Reeve, 1999, p. 178). 
Terrorism, in some cases, can be financed by small amounts of funds, involving family or 
other non-criminal sources (the FATF, 2008, p. 14). The amount of money to launch small 
attacks can be acquired by individual terrorists or their supporters “using savings, access to 
credit or the proceeds of businesses under their control” (ibid). An example of such financing 
is the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London transport system. The official report in this regard 
stated that “there is no evidence of external sources of income. Our best estimates are that the 
overall cost is less than GBP 8000. The bombs were homemade, that the ingredients used 
were all readily commercially available and not particularly expensive” (ibid). 
To sum up, it should be noted that there is no accurate data or evidence as to whether 
terrorists rely more on one of these sources than another (Koh, 2006, p. 24). Resort to any of 
these sources depends on the type, size and purposes of groups, opportunities at hand and 
types of resources needed. For example, Al-Qaeda has at least five financial resources: 
investments and inheritances of Osama Bin Laden, funding from wealthy Arab supporters, 
contribution through charities, income from investments in legal businesses and criminal 
activities (ibid). Table I categorizes the sources of terrorist financing, mentioned above, in 










                      Table I: The lawful and unlawful financial sources of terrorists. 
2.3 Methods and means of moving and storing terrorist funds   
The literature on terrorist financing highlights the great “adaptability and opportunism” that 
terrorists or their supporters exploit to move and store their funds (Williams, 2005, p.2). In 
general, there are three main known methods by which terrorist funds are moved: formal and 
informal financial systems, physical movement of funds and value, and the international trade 
system (the FATF, p. 21).    
2.3.1 Financial System 
The formal financial system is an attractive channel for the financing of terrorism due to the 
provision of services and products by which terrorists can move their funds, and due to the 
“speed and ease” with which funds can be transferred “efficiently and effectively between 
and within jurisdictions” (Runder, 2010, p. 706). Money and value operations through formal 
financial systems enable terrorist financers or terrorists to make an amount of money 
available to terrorists at another financial institution. The 9/11 Commission Report made 
clear that “wire or bank to bank transfers” were one of the main tools that Al-Qaeda used to 
fund the hijackers in the US (the 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, pp. 245, 254).      
 Formal financial institutions can also provide cover for terrorists to conduct transactions or 
conceal the origin of their funds. In the case of al Qaeda, it was discovered that Usama Bin 
Laden, while he lived in Sudan, opened different accounts under fake names in different 
countries, which guaranteed his privacy (Kiser, 2005, p.86).     
In addition to formal financial systems, informal value transfer systems (IVTS) are deployed 
for financing terrorism.  An informal method of money and value transfers refers to a trust-
based mechanism through which money is ensured to be transferred to another geographic 
location by “using a series of informal, and often unlicensed, money exchanges” (Vittori, 
2011, p. 45). In this mechanism, there may be no actual movement of cash; instead, value is 
transferred between two locations. Such financial arrangements, which are very well known 
in South Asia, the Middle East and parts of  Africa, are known by different names: for 
example  hundi in India, fei chi’ien in China, phoe kuah in Thailand and hawala in Muslim 
countries (Kiser, 2005, p. 90). 
Origin of sources      Self-financed  sources Sponsored sources 
Lawful sources State Sponsorship Investment in legal businesses  
Individual and institutional sponsorship  Internal sources 
Fundraising initiatives Wealthy donors 
Unlawful sources Criminal activities  
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Informal methods are attractive to criminals, including terrorists, for their convenience, level 
of anonymity and rapidity (the FATF, 2008, p. 24). Also, it is a reliable means to transfer 
money especially in countries with poor, corrupt or nonexistent banking systems (Vittori, 
2011, p. 46). Furthermore, such a system is subject to generally less strict regulatory control. 
It is reported that Hamas, the Jemaah Islamiya organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam, as terrorist groups, receive funds through hawala (Passas, 2007, p. 31).  
  2.3.2 Physical movement of funds 
Terrorists may also use the traditional money laundering method of smuggling cash. Cash 
smuggling is attractive because smuggled money is completely fungible, anonymous, and 
more importantly, easy to convert into any other resources needed. Cases highlight that 
smuggled money can be transported either to where terrorist operations are to take place, or 
where the cash can be deposited into financial systems with less risk (Kiser, 2005, p. 91). 
Due to some of the disadvantages of cash smuggling, such as difficulties in concealing large 
quantities of cash or the danger of being detected or stolen, terrorists and their supporters may 
use precious metals and gems such as gold, platinum and diamonds, antiques or any other 
expensive items to move and store terrorist funds. While maintaining their value and 
liquidity, they are easy to conceal and untraceable (Koh, 2006, p. 30). These items can be 
converted into cash whenever needed. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah are believed to have been 
active in this field (Farah, 2004a). Also, it has been reported that donations to the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda from Saudi wealthy donators were made in gold (Farah, 2004b).  
2.3.3 Trade system 
The international trade system provides an opportunity for perpetrators to transfer value and 
goods through legitimate trade flows. This is the area in which enormous wealth can cross 
borders without raising suspicion “as the paperwork and shipments may look completely 
legitimate to outside inspection” (Passas, 2007, p. 31). Over-and under-invoicing practices 
are commonly used by launderers to transfer value across borders. It is possible, although it 
has not been confirmed (ibid), that terrorists or their supporters also use such methods to 
finance terrorism. For example, by selling and shipping a commodity at a lower rate than the 
actual value, a seller, as a terrorist financer, can provide funds for the buyer who sells the 
products at a higher price and keeps the difference for terrorist purposes (ibid).   
3. Financing of terrorism and terrorism typologies 
There are many different categories of terrorism. These categorises help to differentiate 
terrorist groups according to specific criteria related to a specific field. On the basis of the 
strategies that terrorists use to finance their activities, terrorism can be divided into seven 
groups: state sponsored, state sponsoring, shell state, franchise, bundled support, 
transnational corporation, and lone wolf (Vittori, 2011, p. 7.).  
A state-sponsored group receives substantial supports from a state which seeks particular 
political or ideological objectives. The state may find numerous ways to support terrorists 
such as supplying them with false documentation and passports, allowing them to travel 
safely within the nation or to other countries and providing them with sanctuary and 
weapons. The autonomy of groups in this category depends on how integrated they are into a 
particular state’s command and control (ibid). Terrorists may receive support from states as 
long as that aid does not disturb their independence. However, state sponsors may place 
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requirements on groups for receipt of support in order to guide them into specific direction. In 
such a case, in what are called “state-directed groups” (Deatherage, 2008, p.31), the groups 
exist as long as they are worthwhile for the sponsor states.   
A state sponsoring terrorist group is one that is capable of providing facilities for a state 
sponsor in return for receiving support from that state (Vittori, 2011, p. 8). For example, the 
government of Sudan let Al-Qaeda have training camps in Sudan in exchange for money and 
building infrastructure (Byman, 2005, p. 187). It is believed that terrorist-sponsoring groups 
have to have achieved a high level of capability to attract state sponsor attention (Vittori, 
2011, p. 8).  
In the case of “shell states”, terrorists take control of a geographical area and exploit it for 
sanctuary and their needs (Napoleoni, 2005, p. 65). An area can be as small as a few 
neighbourhoods or as large as a huge area in a country. The example of this type of terrorism 
is narcoterrorism, explained above.   
In the franchise category, terrorist groups receive a large portion of their support from one 
source, but not limited only to that source; so the groups remain independent (Vittori, 2011, 
p. 8). In this case, if the sponsor stop supporting, although the groups may weaken, but they 
may not be doomed to extinction. For example, it is claimed that Hamas and Hezbollah are 
franchisees of Iran, from whom they receive much of their support,[6] but they also maintain 
their own network of charities, front companies and criminal networks to sustain their 
activities (Levitt, 2007, p.134).   
In the “bundled support” category, terrorists do not rely on one or few sponsors; instead, they 
receive a number of tangible and intangible resources from numerous non-state contributors 
(Vittori, 2011, p. 114). The phenomenon of diaspora support, in which terrorists receive 
support from dispersed donors of the same ethnicity or nationality, is the prominent example 
of this category. Many small contributions from different contributors give terrorist groups 
more autonomy than a state sponsored terrorist group. Nonetheless, they may not be 
supported when they fail to satisfy their sponsors (ibid).   
In the transnational corporation model, extensively used to describe Al-Qaeda, terrorist 
groups act on a global scale without any specific national identification. These groups, 
utilizing globalization, are highly sophisticated and complex in resourcing, membership and 
geographical operations (Cronin, 2002-2003, p. 45). Groups within this model are experts at 
using formal and informal financial systems, front companies, charities, money laundering 
and other criminal activities. They also have a high level of autonomy as they have access to 
various financial resources.        
Lone wolf terrorism is the example of terrorist groups which are not essentially involved in 
collective, organized activities (Spaaij, 2012, p. 15). Lone wolf terrorist groups are 
individuals or small groups which are identifiable by a particular ideology, and which carry 
out actions in support of their radical belief (Vittori, 2002, p. 7). Unlike other types, lone wolf 
terrorist groups are small in size with few financial requirements, and limited capabilities. 
They are self-contained, free to choose their targets and tactics. Terrorism in this form is very 
cheap; but the causes can be significant. It is claimed that there is a considerable trend which 
indicates the increasing frequency of lone wolf attacks by individuals with little or no 
connections to formal organizations (Michael, 2012, p. 1). Terrorist attacks in France in 
March 2012 (Nimmo, 2012,), in Norway in July 2012 (Spaaij, 2012, p.1) , in Germany in 
March 2011 (FoxNews, 2011) are recent examples of lone wolf terrorism.    
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4. The role of money laundering in terrorist financing 
Money laundering is internationally defined as the process of conversion or transfer, 
concealment or disguise, and possession or use of any income or property derived from 
illegal activities (hereinafter “predicate crimes”) (UN, 1988, Article 2 (h)). The origin of the 
term money laundering arose in the US in 1920s when mafia groups utilized launderettes to 
acquire a legitimate appearance for money generated from their criminal activities (Stessens, 
2000, p. 82). [7] Later, with the explosion of drug trafficking in 1980s, money laundering 
became an important part of any serious offence enterprise, especially “organized crime” 
activities, from which huge profits are generated (Gilmore, 1999, p. 9). [8] The main purpose 
of money laundering operations is twofold: to hide the predicate (often organized) crimes 
from which the proceeds are obtained, and to guarantee that criminals can enjoy their 
proceeds by using or investing in the legal economy (Stessens, 2000, p.83 ).    
To fulfil these goals, launderers use various and complex techniques to launder their 
proceeds. These techniques very briefly may include using financial institutions as a deposit-
taking institutions, “non-bank financial  institutions”, non financial institutions, or other 
informal methods such as the purchase of art treasures and jewellery, techniques of illegal 
money importation,  techniques of smurfing or nominal partnerships, gambling, techniques of 
overpayment on tax accounts, techniques related to real estate, the buying of gift vouchers, 
assuring real estate credit, establishing fictitious business organisations, fictitious 
transactions, creating a cover company, techniques of over-or under-charge, methods of 
acquisition and selling of companies, acquisition of sports clubs, respectively player, gold 
purchase , barter trade systems and so on (Gilmore, 1999, p.30). 
The involvement of these techniques in laundering is too complex to explain here. However, 
it has become common to illustrate the process of laundering, especially those involved with 
drug money, by utilising a three-stage framework (ibid, p. 29):  
1- Placement stage:  proceeds at the first step need to either enter a financial system or 
be used to buy an asset.  
2- In the “layering stage” a launderer, through some financial transactions, tries to 
conceal and disguise the source of the money. This step can be done by breaking 
down the money to small amounts and transferring it to different financial institutions.   
3- In the final stage, ‘integration’, the money is assimilated along with all other assets in 
the system in order to make the money appear as if it were obtained legally.  
Regarding the nature of the crime, money laundering can be described as a “legitimisation-
oriented concept” (Koh, 2006, p.26) which contains the following features: 
 The money involved in the process of money laundering is, in all cases, derived from 
illegal activities.  
 Money laundering is a derivative crime or an output of predicate crimes.  
 The main purpose in money laundering is to disguise the origin of proceeds in order 
for criminals to enjoy their ill-gotten gains (Stessens, 2000, p. 84).    
 Money laundering takes place when principal crimes (predicate crimes) have already 
been committed. The necessity of laundering makes detecting criminals by chasing 
the proceeds of their illegal activities more possible. 
However, in regard to financing terrorism, there is a different story. Terrorist financing can 
be divided into “a framework with three levels”: activities done to make and raise funds for 
terrorist purposes,[9] strategies used to move the funds whence they have been collected to 
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where they need to be held, and methods used to move funds to frontline terrorists (Vittori, 
2011, p. 26).  It seems that terrorist financing is a phenomenon which begins with fund 
raising and ends by distributing the funds to terrorist cells.      
The emphasis, in such a case, is not on the legitimization and accumulation of funds, but 
making funds available to terrorist cells; so, terrorist funds do not inevitably need to go 
through those money laundering stages by which the proceeds of organized crime are 
processed. However, money laundering can be a part of terrorist financing process in some 
case, as illustrated in Diagram II.  
Regarding the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing, terrorist funds can be 
processed under three scenarios:  
Scenario one: when the funds have been derived from legal sources, nothing appears 
illegal except the future use of the money. The funds, in this case, can be transferred by 
non- criminal individuals or legal entities like charities and front companies, and through 
the legal financial system.   
Scenario two: terrorists are involved with criminal activities in order to generate funds 
for their terrorist purposes. So, they may need to launder the proceeds of their crime if 
they wish to invest proceeds to produce regular revenue. If the funds come under 
scrutiny at this stage, there may be no connection with terrorist activities. Also, after 
having been laundered, the disguised the origin of money might not be identifiable 
because the connection between the funds and their illegal source has already been 
interrupted; in result, the funds have a legitimate appearance.    
 Scenario three: the proceeds of crime are directly (without being laundered)  used by 
terrorist cells. In this case, terrorists do not need to launder the money, because the 
amount of money on the move can be small. 
 





Diagram II. illustrates how terrorist financing can be processed (Tofangsaz, 2012, p.401).    
 
In comparison with money laundering, the main characteristics of the terrorist financing 
process are:  
Lawful 
sources  Terrorism Terrorist    
funds   
Unlawful 










 Unlike money laundering the subject matter of which is money of crime, in terrorist 
financing, “funds” is a matter of discussion, which means “assets of every kind, 
whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal 
documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing 
title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, 
travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, 
letters of credit” (UN, 1999, Article 1).    
 Terrorist financing involves preparing funds for the commission of another crime. 
So, it is an input into terrorism, and preparatory in its nature. 
 When terrorist financing occurs, the principal crime (terrorism) has not been 
committed or even attempted yet; so, the relationship between the funds and 
terrorist activities may or may not be identifiable.  
 The purpose in terrorist financing is not accumulation, but distribution. In result, the 
amount of funds on the move may often be very small (Bantekas, 2003, p. 321).  
 The attempt in terrorist financing is to hide the destination of the funds.  
5.  Discussion on the relationship of terrorist financing and money  
laundering  
There has been a continuing argument on whether the measures provided to counter money 
laundering are able to prevent and counteract terrorist financing. Those who support the 
integration of terrorist financing into anti-money laundering measures base their argument on 
two inaccurate assumptions: the link and nexus between terrorism and criminal activities 
(Napoleoni, 2003, p.25), and the involvement of terrorist financing in money laundering (the 
FATF, 2000-2001, p.28).  
5.1 Terrorists’ involvement in criminal (organized) activities 
The first assumption, which emphasizes and exaggerates the involvement of terrorists in 
criminal (especially organized) activities as the main source of terrorist financing, considers 
terrorism as a crime which generates proceeds with regard to which laundering may happen. 
(Kersten, 2002, p. 301). The reflection of this argument can be explicitly seen in the Council 
Directive on prevention of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering (the 
Council of the European Communities, 10 June 1991) where it provides that 
since money laundering occurs not only in relation to the proceeds of drug-related offences 
but also in relation to the proceeds of other activities (such as organized crime and terrorism), 
the Member States should, within the meaning of their legislations, extend the effects of the 
Directive to include the proceeds of such activities, to the extent that they likely to result in 
laundering operations justifying sanctions on that basis. 
This assumption is to some degree true. Regarding the evidence and studies on terrorist 
financing typologies mentioned above, it has been proved that terrorist groups, in some cases, 
are involved in criminal activities. However, complete reliance on the assumption to justify 
the inclusion of terrorism into the instruments related to organized crime (and as result, 
inclusion of terrorist financing into anti-money laundering measures) can be problematic for 
the following reasons.  
First of all, it is wrong to presume that terrorism is a crime for the purpose of making money. 
Terrorists are generally motivated by ideology greater than personal impulses or material 
benefits (Conte, 2010, p. 10). So, their engagement in crime to fund their activities needs to 
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be considered as an instrumental purpose (Dandurand and Chin, 2004, p. 5). This feature 
distinguishes it from other criminal acts, especially organized crime, which are not “afforded 
any kind of excuse” as criminals seek personal or financial gains (Bantekas, 2003, p. 318). 
More importantly, terrorist funds can be acquired from legal sources. This considerably 
differentiates terrorist financing from organized criminal activities. 
In addition to the distinct motivations, terrorists evaluate their conduct according to the 
standards and “codex of the ideology” that they follow (Conte, 2010, p. 11). So, even though 
an act is illegal and unjustifiable under the law of a state or international law, it might be 
legitimate and appropriate from the terrorists’ perspective. Emphasizing the significant 
consequence of this feature, some argue that “standard criminology” cannot apply to the case 
of terrorism since “the notion of deterrence is largely irrelevant, with the language of 
terrorists often entirely divorced from that of the normal criminal offender” (ibid).   
Moreover, it is impossible to estimate to what extent and how “widespread” terrorists’ 
involvement in criminal (organized) activities is (Dandurand and Chin, 2004, p. 18). In 2003, 
a report indicated that 14 of the 36 groups found on the US State Department’s list of foreign 
terrorist groups were engaged in drug trafficking (US Congress, 2003). This is applied by the 
officials to justify that the war on terror and the war on drugs are and should be linked. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion was correctly criticized as “there are hundreds of terrorist 
organizations and drug trafficking groups, but it is usually the same dozen or so groups that 
get identified as being involved in both types of activities” (Dandurand and Chin, 2004, p. 
12). 
From an international law perspective, the inclusion of the concept of terrorism within the 
scope of international instruments relating to organized crime is also problematic. The 
problem lies in the nature and definition of terrorism. While there is not an agreement  on a 
concrete definition of terrorism, and on the designation of groups as terrorist groups, certain 
characteristics of organized crime have been at least identified over the course of time 
(Obokata, 2010, p.14). With regard to this fact, the inclusion of terrorism in instruments 
related to organized crime has the potential to “divide parties to a treaty and make it 
unworkable” (Bantekas, 2003, p. 318). It might be the reason why the authors of the UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) avoided the inclusion of terrorist 
acts in the definition of organised crime in spite of acknowledging the involvement of 
terrorists in criminal activities (Bantekas, 2003).  
By exemplifying the practices of few terrorist groups, it is also argued that “terrorist groups 
are now turning gradually into a big business … and enjoy the unexpected fruits of their way 
of life” (Koh, 2006, p. 21). However, regarding the paucity of available data, it does not make 
sense to claim that such transformation is a typical or common pattern for all terrorist groups 
(Dandurand and Chin, 2004, p. 5). Moreover, from a criminal law perspective, if a terrorist 
group is transformed into some sort of a criminal organization, it can no longer be considered 
as a terrorist group.  
To end this, it is worthwhile to note the result of the questionnaire administrated by the 
United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (September 2002) indicating that  
Terrorist groups are frequently involved in other crime, particularly illegal drug trafficking, 
smuggling of migrants, falsification of illicit travel and identity documents, trafficking in 
firearms and other exploitation of illicit markets. However, the responses did not provide 
strong evidence of organizational links between terrorist groups and organized criminal 
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groups. There was no indication either that criminal groups were becoming more involved in 
terrorist acts. [10]  
5.2 Terrorists’ involvement in money laundering   
Unlike the first assumption which emphasises inaccurately and exaggeratedly on the illegal 
sources of terrorist funds, the second assumption focuses on the tools and methods which 
terrorists use to conceal the flow of their funds (the FATF, 2000-2001, p. 19). This 
assumption acknowledges that although terrorist funds can be derived from both legal and 
illegal sources, terrorists process their funds–“that is, move them from the source to where 
they will be used” – in the same way that non-terrorist criminals launder funds (the FATF, 
2002-2003).   
In other words, terrorists are involved in either money laundering or “reverse money 
laundering”.  If terrorists are involved with criminal activities, they need to use the same 
methods as criminals to conceal the origin of proceeds. If terrorist funds have a legitimate 
origin, then terrorists must engage in “reverse money laundering” (Cassella, 2003, p. 93), 
which is the application of the same methods and tools used by launderers to hide the 
destination of funds. In this regard, it has been noted that (Kochan, 2006, p. 245):  
Terrorists use the same professional money network, they use the same convoluted 
transactions to hide the location of the money or where it’s going. They can use the same 
clandestine shipment of cash to avoid paper-trails. They can engage in the same international 
shell games as they move money from this account to that, disguised as legitimate funds for 
some lawful purpose when it really is to finance new crime and new criminal enterprises … 
The source of the money doesn’t matter, it is the deadly purpose the money was intended to 
fund.     
As a result of this analogy, it is concluded that there is significant room for anti-money 
laundering measures to deal with the phenomenon of terrorist financing. Therefore, terrorist 
financing is considered as a sub-category of money laundering, or a predicate crime to money 
laundering which potentially can be detected, investigated and prevented by the already 
existing measures (the FATF, 2000-2001, p. 28).  
The logic of this assumption is not compelling for following reasons. Most of all, it is 
questioned whether money laundering counter-measures can be a ‘one size fits all’ solution 
for all crimes in which offenders may use the same money network as launders use to conceal 
the origin of their funds. The point is that these measures have been designed to prevent drug 
offences or offences whose purposes are the legitimatization and accumulation of huge 
amount of money generated from criminal activities (Stessens, 2000, p. 3). However, in 
regard to terrorist financing, none of these elements are necessarily involved. 
With regard to the accumulation element, while the basic requirement in money laundering 
operations is to launder and accumulate a large amount of money, not only does terrorist 
financing end by distributing funds to terrorist cells, but also “terrorism can, and does, 
operate on a shoestring” (Lilley, 2006, p.129). This affects the volume of the money 
circulated in terrorist-related transactions. The 9/11 Commission Report provides an 
interesting insight into how easy it was for the 11 September hijackers to carry out their 
transactions. For example, it is reported that they mainly operated through wire transfers, 
using sums not exceeding $10000 each time. The members of groups were on student visas 
and seemed to be receiving funds from their family or in the form of grants for their studies 
(Kean and Hamilton, 2004, p. 237). It is also emphasised that none of the hijackers’ 
transactions were “extraordinary or remarkable”.         
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In terms of the legitimization element, when terrorists are involved in crime to finance their 
activities, the quick response is that they are involved in money laundering. Of course, 
terrorists wish to hide the illegal sources of their funds (Dandurand and Chin, 2004, p. 14). 
However, regarding the fact that the purpose in terrorist financing is to make funds available 
to terrorists on the ground, not to integrate funds into financial systems (Lilley, 2006, p. 150), 
the question is whether the funds necessarily need to go through those complex money 
laundering stages and processes to become usable? The answer is positive if terrorists intend 
to invest proceeds to produce regular revenue.  
Looking at the evidence, it is argued that while the “movement of terrorist-related funds and 
transactions” are not similar to usual transactions, it does not include complex stages and 
processes taken place in money laundering (Bantekas, 2003, p. 321). In addition, the result of 
a study on money laundering activities in the East and Southern African Anti-Money 
Laundering Group countries shows that although it was more likely that terrorist funds in this 
region originate from illegal sources rather than legal sources, no indication as to the link 
between money laundering activities and terrorist groups had been found (Goredema, 2003, 
p. 16).       
What radically challenges the assumption of the inclusion of money laundering counter-
measures to terrorist financing is the fact that proceeds derived from criminal activities are 
not the main source of funds for terrorists (Schmid et al., 2000). As mentioned earlier, 
terrorist funds may have a legal origin. In such a case, if terrorists, for whatever reason, 
attempt to hide funds or their origin, it does not mean that they apply money laundering 
methods. Even if they apply similar tools and methods used by criminals to move and transfer 
their money, they do not necessarily engage in money laundering “in the normal sense of the 
word” (Dandurand and Chin, 2004, p. 18). In fact, unlike money laundering, where terrorist 
financing takes place there is no crime that precedes the endeavour to conceal the origin of 
funds from detection. There is, however, “criminal intent”, but it is not sufficient to conclude 
that the funds intended to be used for terrorist purposes is “the proceeds of that criminal 
intent” (Kersten, 2002, p. 306).    
6. Conclusion 
Terrorism is not a crime for money; however, terrorists need resources to sustain their 
activities. This gives terrorist financing a multitudinous nature; that is, terrorism can be 
financed by any means, legal or illegal, and by anyone, terrorists or non-perpetrators. This 
feature also considerably differentiates terrorist financing from all those (organized) crime 
which ends in money laundering. The role and purposes of money laundering are to gain a 
legitimate appearance for the proceeds derived from illegal (often organized) activities, and 
to accumulate them into the legal economy. This necessitates that criminal activities from 
which proceeds are derived precede money laundering.  
None of these elements are necessarily involved in the most terrorist financing cases as the 
financial flows in terrorist financing go in a different direction. Terrorism financing begins 
with the gathering funds and ends by distributing funds to terrorists. In such a process, there 
is no need for legitimization especially when the funds have a legal origin. Even if terrorist 
funds have an illegal background, money laundering cannot play a leading role because the 
purpose in terrorist financing is not the accumulation of funds in financial systems. 
Similar to money laundering in which the attempt is to hide the origin of proceeds from 
detection, the effort in financing terrorism is to conceal the funds and their destination from 
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scrutiny. This similarity has been used to draw an analogy between money laundering and 
terrorist financing, justifying that terrorists and their supporters apply the same methods as 
those employed by launderers in organized crime to move terrorist funds (Cassella, 2003, 
p.92). Nonetheless, where terrorist financing takes place there is possibly no crime that 
relates to or is connected with the endeavour to conceal the movement of funds from 
detection. There is, of course, “criminal intent”, but it is not reasonable to consider the funds 
“as the proceeds of that criminal intent” (Kersten, 2002, p. 306). To sum up, what money 
laundering and terrorist financing share in common is money. However, while the money 
involved in the former has a dirty background, the funds engaged in the latter have a 
dangerous nature. This raises serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the inclusion of anti-
money laundering system designed to trace, stop or restrict the ability of criminals to enjoy 
their ill-gotten money counter terrorist financing. The implications of such integration have 
not been discussed in this paper.    
 
Notes:  
1-This question has been examined by Kersten (2002) from a “methodological” perspective.  
2- The case of state-sponsored terrorism is beyond the purview of the present paper, as it is available 
to small number of terrorists groups, and it has been decreasing over time. In addition, it is highly 
unlikely that such cases can be argued and solved through the anti-money laundering and terrorist 
financing regime.  
3- A very famous example of wealthy donors is Usma bin Laden  who spent his estimated 20-30 
million USD inheritance for Al Qaeda. Also, it is claimed that Shad Sunders, a  rich Tamil-living in 
California,  donated  4 million USD to the Tamil Tigers. See Peter L. Bergen (2006), The Osama bin 
Laden I know : an oral history of al-Qaeda's leader, Free Press, New York, p. 10. Also see Steve 
Kiser (2005), “Financing terror : an analysis and simulation for affecting Al Qaeda's financial 
infrastructure”, Originally presented as the authors Ph.D. dissertation, Rand Corporation,Pardee Rand 
Graduate School, p. 35.      
4-  Zakat, 2.5 percent of one’s accumulated wealth, is an example of donation which might be 
collected by some Islamic charity organizations that are in contact with terrorism. 
5- Tamil diaspora is a noteworthy example of a diaspora “as a people with common national origins 
who lives outside a clamed or an independent country”. Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas across the world 
provide and transfer considerable amount of money and materials to the Tamils people in Sri Lanka. It 
is high likely that  the funds provided go to the hand of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam group 
who has been designated as a terrorist group, and who fight for self-determination against the  Sri 
Lankan Government. 
6- Iran and some countries consider Hezbollah as a legitimate movement of national liberation 
fighting for the liberation of Israeli occupied territories through its military wing. 
7- According to Article 2 (e) of the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (Palermo Convention) “proceeds” mean “any property derived from or obtained, directly or 
indirectly, through the commission of an offence”. 
8- “Organized criminal group” has been defined by the 2000 United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) as “a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
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serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly 
or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”. 
9- The term “funds”, according to 1999 UN Terrorist Financing Convention, refers to “assets of every 
kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents 
or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such 
assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, 
shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.” 
10- In September 2003, pursuant to the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/136, the Terrorism 
Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime sent a questionnaire to Member 
States of the United Nations regarding the “Nature and links between Terrorism and other Forms of 
Crime”. The above quote is the part of analysis of the replies to the questionnaire done by  Dandurand 
and Chin, 2004, p. 32. 
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